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TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):
(U) PLENARY MEETING, OCTOBER 14, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator
. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (U) This is SFO-MOS-003.

12. (U) Meeting Date: October 14, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: MFA Guest House (Osobnyak), Moscow

SUMMARY

13. (S) The third meeting of the START Follow-on (SFO) delegations was held at the Guest House (Osobnyak) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Moscow, Wednesday, October 14, 2009. The Russian side commented extensively on issues related to counting rules, but returned repeatedly to the question of conventional warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs. Amb Streltsov used a lengthy commentary on "what should be counted" in an attempt to demonstrate that there were ambiguities and inconsistencies in the U.S. approach, arguing the nuclear or non-nuclear status of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs would be difficult to determine. He further questioned how it would be possible to distinguish whether a warhead was conventional or nuclear after it was launched.

14. (S) Russian head of delegation Amb Antonov argued there would be a negative impact globally if conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs were deployed. He also alleged that failure to constrain the development of such weapons would pose a dilemma for both the United States and Russia if third

countries carried out missile tests, claiming that they were conventional but which the United States and Russia suspected covered a nuclear program. He also commented that there were already discussions in Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) circles that U.S. deployment of such weapons could lead to an arms race in long-range conventional ballistic missiles. Warner replied that he recognized the Russian side had not judged the U.S. approach to the handling of missiles with conventional warheads as positive, but reminded the Russian side that the United States had not judged their proposal to ban the deployment of conventionally-armed strategic missiles as "positive" either.

15. (S) Mr. Trout discussed the treatment of warheads in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), underscoring that warhead numbers would be presented only in the 6-month reports and that this might result in discrepancies between what inspectors would see and what was in the report, due to the time lag. This effect, however, would be mitigated by a consistent picture developed over time. Mr. Smirnov pursued the question of how it would be possible to determine what kind of warhead was on a missile undergoing testing. The possibility of developing transparency measures and the contribution, together with other factors, of unencrypted telemetry, were raised by Warner and Siemon as potential means to allay those concerns. Siemon recalled that both sides had developed a comprehensive baseline of relevant telemetry data regarding the simulated fuzing of nuclear weapons during the course of the implementation of the START Treaty. Consequently the two sides were starting with a good understanding of the operation of each others' missile

systems during flight tests.

16. (S) Major General Orlov and Mr. Kuznetsov discussed in great detail the process whereby SLBM launchers would be considered to be "non-deployed" or "deployed," and it became clear that the corresponding texts in the Russian proposal were not as clear as they should have been. In summarizing the discussions at the meeting, both A/S Gottemoeller and Antonov pointed to the difficult nature of the problems under discussion but commended the open and comprehensive nature of the dialogue. Orlov said the session demonstrated it was possible to bring the two sides closer through discussion but also that getting the counting rules right was extremely important.

Questions Posed by the Russian Side

17. (S) Antonov announced at the beginning of the session that he would like to proceed from the point where the discussion ended the previous day. He noted there had been a very interesting presentation by Dr. Warner, followed by an equally interesting discussion which merited continuation. Gottemoeller concurred with Antonov's plan and provided the Russian delegation with copies of Warner's presentation on counting rules, in both English and Russian.

18. (S) Ambassador Streltsov said he wanted to make some comments on Warner's presentation that would focus on the differing U.S. and Russian approaches to counting. He suggested the analysis should begin with an assessment of what should be counted, noting that this was a matter of principle. This was a question addressed initially in Article II of the proposed SFO Treaty, which specifies that ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers will be counted. Article III, paragraph 8, states that only existing types, new types declared after the date of signature of the treaty, and other types of strategic offensive arms, if deployed for nuclear weapons after the date of signature, would be subject to treaty limitations, but, according to the U.S. proposal, would specifically exclude ballistic missiles capable of delivering non-nuclear weapons.

19. (S) Then the question arises, Streltsov commented, whether a new type of ballistic missile with a range greater

than 5500 kilometers would be counted or not. On this, he claimed that there was agreement between the two sides since the U.S. definition of an ICBM includes ballistic missiles with a range of more than 5500 kilometers. There was also agreement between the two sides on the definition of SLBMs. But Article III, subparagraph 2, of the U.S. text stated that non-nuclear warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs would also not be counted. Streltsov acknowledged that he found it understandable to provide for non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs in the U.S. arsenal, but he wondered what status they would have. Shall we consider them to be the same as nuclear-armed ICBMs and SLBMs? How does this accord with the fact that the treaty is about "strategic offensive arms?"

¶10. (S) Streltsov also noted that in her statement on the previous day, the U.S. Secretary of State (Begin comment: Streltsov was referring to Secretary of State Clinton who was

in Moscow to meet with Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov. End comment.) referred to the title of the new treaty as bearing on strategic "nuclear" arms. In this context, it was necessary to consider whether non-nuclear-armed ICBMs and SLBMs should be considered START items. There is a further question, he added, of whether new types of non-nuclear missiles will be considered ICBMs and SLBMs. What should be counted? Warheads or "nuclear" warheads? The Joint Understanding signed in Moscow by the two Presidents, he reminded the group, referred to strategic delivery vehicles and their associated warheads, not associated "nuclear" warheads. The first part of Article II refers to the warheads of ICBMs and SLBMs, whereas subparagraph (b) of the same article speaks of "nuclear" warheads. Of course, he added, we have already discussed the so-called "nuclear ambiguity."

¶11. (S) Streltsov commented that the United States dealt with this ambiguity, but not in a simple way: Article V, paragraph 3, states "for the purposes of this treaty, each RV mounted on an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered as one nuclear warhead unless proven otherwise." Here the question arises of how to go about "proving" this. For example, an ICBM or an SLBM is launched. How, he asked, is the United States going to prove/demonstrate its nuclear or non-nuclear character? Streltsov claimed that he had looked at all of the texts including the Inspection Protocol and did not find anything which addressed this problem, although it was important to do so because the creation of a data base was related to the resolution of the problem of "warheads" vs. "nuclear warheads," and the conduct of inspections is determined by the information included in the data base.

¶12. (S) Gottemoeller thanked Streltsov for his extended comment and noted that as hard as experts try, they cannot always ensure that the information provided for ministers is entirely accurate. She added that both sides agreed on the title of the treaty, which refers to "strategic offensive arms."

¶13. (S) Warner commented that, since the beginning of their discussions, the U.S. and Russian sides have had a markedly different view of how to treat conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs. The Russian side has proposed that the deployment of such systems should be banned, while the U.S. side proposes that new types developed and tested solely for non-nuclear warheads should not be subject to the limitations of the SFO Treaty. There was no distinction based on range; none would count even if the range was consistent with the treaty definitions of ICBM and SLBM: the missile would not be subject to its provisions. He knew, he said, that this U.S. position was not welcomed by the Russian side, but the Russian proposal to ban conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs was not welcomed by the U.S. side either.

¶14. (S) Warner continued that, concerning the Russian point that it would be difficult to distinguish which were the missiles which were solely developed for conventional armaments, this should be discussed in detail. It might be that transparency measures could be introduced during testing

that could help the Russian side identify that the missile being tested was designed solely for the purpose of carrying conventional warheads and thus would not be subject to the

limits of the treaty.

¶15. (S) Warner added that he wanted to make a point on Article II. It was noteworthy that the article spoke first of warheads, without a qualifier, and yet in subparagraph (b) it states that the warheads subject to the ceilings would be nuclear warheads. He agreed that this could be seen as an inconsistency but the intention was clear with regard to the aggregate ceiling which explicitly applied to "nuclear" warheads. When the U.S. side introduced the limits, it made clear that this limit applied only to "nuclear" warheads.

¶16. (S) Streltsov interjected that, if this were the case, how should the Joint Understanding be interpreted? Warner replied this was a summary statement, while the relevant portion of the treaty was clear. He added that the point Streltsov raised in Article III, paragraph 5, which referred to a reentry vehicle considered to be nuclear unless demonstrated otherwise, referred to distinguishing between nuclear-armed reentry vehicles and other objects during a nuclear warhead inspection and not during flight. He conceded the point that Streltsov had made about "nuclear ambiguity"--it would be extremely difficult to determine the payload, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, while a strategic missile was in flight. But he recalled that the U.S. side had spoken in the past about possible steps to mitigate this problem, which might include advance notification. Warner added that the Inspection Protocol and related annexes describe the potential use of radiation detection equipment (RDE) to determine the difference between nuclear-armed reentry vehicles and "inert objects." In the case of the Trident, there might be a combination of nuclear warheads and other objects used for ballast. During a nuclear warhead inspection it would be possible to determine if they were non-nuclear objects by the use of RDE. This could afford a means of demonstrating which objects were conventional and therefore not subject to the limitations of the treaty.

¶17. (S) Gottemoeller commented that there were clearly major differences between the U.S. and Russian approaches and that there would be future opportunities to discuss these in detail. Trout, she indicated, would address aspects of the question related to the data base.

¶18. (S) Trout observed that, during the 6-month update of the MOU, the United States would propose to list the number of warheads for each ICBM and SLBM launcher. Unlike other data in the MOU, however, warhead listings would not be updated in between the 6-month declarations. Therefore, during a nuclear warhead inspection, there might be a discrepancy between the information the inspection team was given and the data provided some months before during the 6-month update. Individual missiles at the time of the inspection might well have different numbers of warheads than listed in the MOU. Moreover, the 6-month update would contain data that was 30 days later than the actual data. However, over time it would be possible to see the consistency in the numbers of warheads per launcher.

¶19. (S) Commenting on the exchange, Antonov said he had listened carefully to Warner. He had tried to make up a scheme to solve the problem, bearing in mind there were only 40 days left for negotiation. The situation, he thought was

simple, but the problem was "dangerous." One way to solve the problem was for Russia to renege on its approach and forget about all the problems associated with the deployment of conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs. In this case, the "grey zone" for ICBMs and SLBMs would increase until at a certain stage--when that stage would be was unknown--the number of conventionally-armed missiles would exceed the nuclear-armed ones, while the data would reflect no difference. It was difficult to imagine that Russia could pursue this approach. He could not, he said, propose to

Russian authorities to change their position. The only solution was for the American side to accept the Russian proposal, i.e., to record things as they were and to ban deployment of conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs in this treaty. He recalled that the U.S. side had said in any case that there had not yet been a final U.S. decision on whether to develop and deploy conventional warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs.

120. (S) Antonov added it was important to think seriously about this issue, it was not possible "to close our eyes" to this matter. Also, it would not be possible to solve all of the problems in the time remaining. He suggested that if we want a treaty by December 5, we should solve the serious issues, but we might have to put aside certain problems. He recalled that the U.S. side had indicated a willingness to engage in further negotiations in the future.

121. (S) Gottemoeller observed that both sides understood the gravity of the problem but their respective positions were 180 degrees apart. The Russian proposal to ban conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs was not the only possible solution. Antonov conceded that perhaps Gottemoeller had a point, but added that "today at this table we have only a temporary solution to the problem." He said it was impossible to imagine that when the Russian side left the table they would accept the U.S. position of permitting conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs to be unconstrained by the SFO Treaty, which he described as "just horrible." He wanted to draw attention to the statement by President Medvedev that the treaty would be studied very carefully by the members of the NAM. The President was not making this up, Antonov asserted, commenting that the NAM discusses such things in their meetings--there had already been discussions alluding to the idea that the development of conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs would lead to an arms race. Up to this point, Russian officials had refused, even when asked, to comment on matters so as to not to be perceived as trying to put pressure on the United States, understanding perfectly how such comments could be used. He added that, speaking personally, after negotiations on SFO Treaty were concluded, there would be further analysis in Moscow of all of these problems, and he felt confident that "in a different atmosphere" the Russian side would continue to focus on this problem in discussions with the United States. He foresaw that in discussions of missile proliferation, the subject of conventionally-armed systems would be a priority.

122. (S) At this point, Gottemoeller asked Antonov to review the schedule for the morning to ensure that there would be adequate time to hear the Russian presentation on counting rules. After some discussion, the two negotiators agreed

that an hour and a half would be reserved for the Russian presentation.

123. (S) Streltsov next alleged there were aspects of the U.S. draft which would contribute to instability if certain formulations were adopted. For instance, there were the definitions of ICBMs and SLBMs that do not mention conventional armaments, and in the provision that discusses the conduct of tests of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs there is a reference to "equipped with conventional armaments." If the other side asks questions in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), and believed that such type should be covered by the treaty, how will this be resolved? He referred to Secretary Clinton's remark two days earlier that nuclear weapons experts will wonder about why there is no ban on encryption of telemetry such as was included in SALT II, in the new treaty, asking how would those same experts react to inconsistencies in the new treaty.

124. (S) Antonov wondered how the United States and the Russian Federation would react to tests of ICBMs and SLBMs by third countries if they claim that the tests are for conventional armaments and instead it is suspected that those countries were covering up nuclear aspirations. He noted

that he had addressed this question to U/S Tauscher as well. Antonov called on both sides to think hard about what sort of treaty they are creating. Warner responded that, while he did not deal with non-proliferation professionally, he wanted to say on a personal basis that the United States certainly takes proliferation concerns seriously and works very hard to discourage proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, with particular emphasis on combating the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

¶25. (S) Responding to the Smirnov question regarding one's ability to distinguish the testing of a missile to be used for conventional as opposed to nuclear warheads, Warner noted that telemetry information could be an important element in determining the character of the weapon a missile might carry by observing flight testing. Analysis of telemetry alone would not be sufficient, but, nonetheless, it would be important. There would need to be a combination of various means, including the exchange of telemetric data and interpretive data. This all could contribute to the information needed to determine the nature of the flight test. In addition, the Parties should look at the use of various transparency measures prior to carrying out the flight test. Frankly, there had been no explicit procedures worked out as yet. This would need to be discussed and developed.

¶26. (S) Smirnov continued by saying that Warner should ask U.S. experts, but in his opinion there was no difference in the telemetry information associated with conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed missiles. Warner said that he was under the impression that various types of data could be provided. To demonstrate transparency would require working with telemetry experts on the matter and would take a combination of methods.

¶27. (S) Siemon stated that he had not specifically looked at the problem of detecting the simulation of conventional warheads during flight tests through the use of use of

telemetry. Developing the conventionally-armed concept was one the United States was considering, but a final decision had not been made. During the START Treaty, the United States conducted many flight tests with warhead "joint test assemblies." With this assembly, the Russian Federation has had access to considerable telemetry information on the simulation of the employment of nuclear warheads from these flight tests. It was Siemon's opinion, based on questions by telemetry experts at the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, that the Russian Federation had a very good understanding of how such warhead functions were simulated. The United States would have to study the problem to see what in the telemetry would be different with the simulated delivery of conventionally-armed reentry vehicles.

Russians Present Their Counting Rules

¶28. (S) Antonov introduced Orlov to give the presentation on the Russian Federation's approach to counting rules, a presentation which, in fact, focused on the reasoning behind its new aggregate limitation on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers.

¶29. (S) Orlov began by saying that the Parties had moved closer together in the course of the previous negotiations in Geneva and thus had demonstrated their ability to find compromise solutions. The discussions of the previous day concerning differences between the sides provided a similar opportunity, and, in the view of the Ministry of Defense, counting rules should be carefully developed, as they are the most important element of the treaty. The Parties could discuss philosophical issues all day, but in the end, we must have precise numbers and strict rules on how those numbers were determined. This effort was the homework for the Russian delegation when it returned to Moscow last week.

130. (S) Orlov said that his purpose was to present the Russian approach and vision on counting rules and to create the necessary condition for future successful discussions in Geneva. Each proposal has its own objectives, and the Russian proposal's objectives included: (a) to reduce in practice the number of delivery vehicles; (b) to show to the world the commitment of the two sides to reduce its strategic forces; and (c) to ensure strategic stability under current and future conditions. He noted that the Cold War was over and that the two Presidents had said this, that the two sides are full fledged partners in many areas, such as combating international terrorism, and, under such conditions, it is not clear why the two sides cannot find mutually acceptable solutions concerning strategic offensive arms.

131. (S) In the Russian view, one of the main issues to be addressed is the existence of the "upload potential" ("vozvratnyy potentsial") for both sides. If the U.S. side were to be asked what the crucial importance of this upload potential was, it is almost certain that it would say launchers, because neither missiles nor warheads fly on their own; they need launchers to do that. One of the U.S. proposals was to establish a limit on deployed strategic offensive arms and to limit only these systems. But in that case the problem of the "upload potential" is not actually

solved. He asserted that the two Presidents had stated in the Joint Understanding that the new treaty should include limits on strategic delivery vehicles and on their associated warheads. The phrase, "inter alia," which is included in the chapeau of the Joint Understanding, means that the treaty need not be comprised of only those provisions that were specified in that document. Consequently, there would be other provisions that could be identified and included without violating the Presidents' mandate to the negotiators.

132. (S) Orlov proposed that the two delegations try to work through the two numbers, 500 and 1100, and come up with a single number for the aggregate limit on strategic delivery vehicles (SDV). Since the new treaty has to provide equal security for each side, the Russian Federation proposed a limit of 500 for the number of SDVs and 1675 for the number of deployed warheads. The additional limit of 600 on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers proposed by the Russian side, is based on the objective reality that each side will also have non-deployed launch systems--not just missiles and warheads, but also launchers, including mobiles.

A Party could have non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers at test ranges and training facilities, and SSBNs could be in overhaul for long periods of time, during which time the launchers would not contain missiles. In addition, Russia and the United States could also have non-deployed launchers without missiles: empty Peacekeeper silos for the United States, and empty RS-20 silos for Russia, and this should be taken into account as well. Such launchers could not be removed from accountability without completing elimination procedures, so the Russian proposal is logical and in the interest of both Parties. Especially of concern are non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers that can be quickly loaded with additional warheads.

133. (S) Orlov explained that, based on Russian calculations, each side had about 200 non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, some of which could be loaded with missiles and warheads, and it is this that is considered to be the "upload potential." The United States wants to limit only non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs, with a proposed numerical limit of 80. But what about the overall number of non-deployed launchers? The Russian approach was different: to provide a separate limit on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, without additional limitations on any specific type of non-deployed launcher. Orlov stated that the presence of upload potential that could significantly increase the nuclear potential of both sides was in neither country's interest, unless the United States had a different view and wanted one country to have nuclear advantage. Russia proposed to carry out real reductions of strategic offensive arms that would not allow unrestricted use of non-deployed

launchers or converted launchers. Orlov claimed that this was a matter of principle for Russia, the aim of which was to ensure equal security, which corresponded to the new political relationship between the two countries.

¶34. (S) Orlov then addressed the question of why the number 600 was chosen for this separate limit. He explained that, after counting the number of deployed launchers needed to support deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, the Russian side calculated that the number of non-deployed launchers that were needed for testing and training purposes was less than what the

sides possessed at this point, and he admitted that the number was a bit more than what the United States had proposed for non-deployed mobile launchers. He emphasized that the Russian proposal did not differentiate between deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and that each side had to right to determine for itself the composition and structure of its forces.

¶35. (S) Gottemoeller asked Orlov to repeat the Russian position concerning SLBM launchers on SSBNs in long-term overhaul. In that case, would the associated launchers be removed from accountability as "non-deployed?" Orlov responded that if the SSBN is at a repair facility for an extended period, and all launchers had been counted previously but the missiles had been removed, after providing the necessary notification, the launchers would be considered to be non-deployed and would be covered within the non-deployed portion of the 600 limit.

¶36. (S) Mr. Elliott asked how the 600 number had been selected; Orlov stated that the United States had proposed 80 non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and 10 launchers at test ranges, and the Russian side just added them together. Elliott asked whether, under the Russian proposal, an additional 100 would simply be added to cover non-deployed systems, hypothetically, irrespective of the numerical limit on deployed systems. Orlov stated that he had proceeded from the understanding that 1100 was the upper level for deployed SDVs, and that nothing should be added to that number. Elliott asked whether an additional 100 would be added to the non-deployed launcher limit if the limit for all deployed systems was 1000. Ilin responded that, if 1000 and 100 were added together, this would be like a "floating" amount, and within this limit each Party can decide for itself what could be contained in it: it is up to the particular Party.

¶37. (S) Warner said that it appeared to him that the difference was larger than 100, since the 500 SDV limit proposed by Russia also included heavy bombers, and he confirmed the rationale behind Elliott's question. He then went through a hypothetical compromise scenario, between 1100 and 500, whereby the sides might agree to an 850 SDV limit, for example. Within that number each side might have 75-100 heavy bombers, and then the deployed and non-deployed number of ICBM and SLBM launchers would be 950. Orlov repeated the Russian proposal: 500 for all three deployed systems, and 600 for both deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, but did not comment on the illustrative case discussed by Warner. (Begin comment: The General appeared ready to respond to the hypothetical question, but Antonov reminded him of the Russian position. End comment.)

¶38. (S) Warner then stated that he had two issues to raise in order to seek to understand the Russian position better. One issue is the observation that the U.S. side has made many times, concerning the nature of U.S. forces: the United States could not live with a limit on 500 deployed SDVs in order to have a force that reflects U.S. traditions and structure--that it would require a number of several hundreds more. For that reason, the U.S. side had viewed the Russian-proposed limit of 600 as reflecting a number that was simply added to the deployed SDV limit of 500. The second issue was to clarify what elements would go into the

non-deployed portion of the combined limit on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, and there were three

elements that came to mind: (a) silo launchers of ICBMs at test ranges and training facilities; (b) mobile launchers of ICBMs, including those at test ranges; and (c) the SLBM launchers associated with SSBNs in extended overhaul, which takes place at shipyards rather than at submarine bases. Warner stressed that the sides needed to go through this type of list on non-deployed strategic missile launchers to determine all the systems that would fall within this increment. Orlov responded that what was needed was a single number, in order to reach understanding in principle.

¶39. (S) Elliott, continuing this line of thought, stated that it seemed to him that a single number, which would include all deployed and non-deployed systems, without differentiation regarding deployed and non-deployed systems, could solve this problem, particularly because each side can determine for itself the structure and composition of its forces. Thus, if the sides were to decide on an aggregate limit of 800, it should be up to each side to decide how best to divide it up. Orlov responded that 500 was the primary number for deployed systems, and it includes heavy bombers, and the additional 100 limit did not include heavy bombers. Elliott again said that it seemed that it would be easier to simply have a single number limit that would not distinguish between deployed and non-deployed systems. Orlov proposed that this overall number be 500, or even 400, in which case the sides could say that they have really reduced their arms.

¶40. (S) Trout, referring to Article III, subparagraph 4(e)(iii), which was taken from START, noted that an SLBM launcher becomes accountable when the SSBN carrying the launcher is launched. Under the Russian proposal, though, it does not become accountable until it arrives at the base and is loaded with SLBMs. Since it normally takes 1-2 years before a newly launched submarine arrives at a submarine base, this provision would imply that a newly constructed submarine and the SLBM launchers it carries would not be accountable under the treaty for an extended period of time. Smirnov turned Trout's attention to Article IV, subparagraph 2(d)(iii) in the Russian proposal, noting that Article IV indicates what is included under treaty limitations in general, when for instance notifications have to be provided and the item is subject to inspections, and Article III indicates how it will count against the aggregate limits. Thus, the SLBM launchers count under the aggregate limits on deployed systems when they are first loaded with SLBMs at the base, but before that time, they are considered to be non-deployed.

¶41. (S) Trout retorted that one of the limits proposed by the Russian side was the limit on deployed and non-deployed launchers, so, it would appear that the launchers would not be counted under the deployed systems limit for several months, and he asked whether it was the Russian position that the SLBM launchers on that new submarine, while that SSBN was enroute to the SSBN base, would not count as non-deployed launchers. Orlov stated that the Russian position was that once the submarine exits the production facility, it is automatically covered by the treaty and the launchers are considered to be non-deployed. Once the submarine reached the submarine base and was loaded with

SLBMs, it is counted as "deployed." Trout remarked that the Russian text, however, did not quite reflect that concept. Orlov said he recognized the problem with the Russian text and it would be fixed.

¶42. (S) Warner noted that, while the United States was unlikely to produce any new SSBNs during the period contemplated for the treaty, Russia may have such submarines of the new Borey or Dolgorukiy class. He observed that it would be unhelpful if the launchers on the submarine had to go back and forth between deployed and non-deployed status, depending on the length of time between the launch of the submarine and the loading of the missiles into the tubes.

¶43. (S) Kuznetsov spoke up, remarking that he was a former submarine commander and wanted to answer the U.S. questions

himself. Russia has a different practice in terms of the "exploitation" (concept for preparing and employing) of submarines, commenting that Warner was correct in noting that Russia will be producing new SSBNs during the life of this treaty. A boat is constructed, and once it leaves the production facility its launchers have already been installed, but this is before the first launcher has been loaded with an SLBM, and it could take several months or even years, because there still need to be tests conducted at the production facility, and sea trials are done operating out of the plant. These activities do not involve the SSBN base, and the submarine is not loaded with SLBMs at anytime during these activities. Kuznetsov said that Orlov proposed that during this time the launchers would be considered to be non-deployed, and then, once the submarine goes to the base and its launchers are loaded, it will become a deployed system. He agreed that these preliminary steps could take some time, but the submarine during this period posed no threat to anyone because its launchers were empty. He assured the U.S. side that once SLBMs were loaded in its launchers, it would be a full-fledged submarine, but before that time, the launchers would be considered non-deployed.

¶44. (S) Kuznetsov said that there was another situation in which the SLBM launchers would be considered to be non-deployed. The Russian cycle is that after 6-7 years of routine operations out of the SSBN base, the submarine goes back to the shipyard for "capital repair." This repair can last a considerable amount of time, from 2-4 years or even longer, and the launchers would not be loaded with SLBMs throughout this period. When the extended capital repair work at the shipyard is complete, the submarine returns to its base and it is again loaded with SLBMs, thus returning to "deployed" status. Kuznetsov recalled that Orlov had correctly proposed that when the SSBN was undergoing extended capital repair, its launchers would be considered non-deployed.

¶45. (S) Trout stated that he understood what Kuznetsov had outlined, and he noted that this same discussion had taken place in the MOU Working Group. However, during the working group meeting the comment was made that an SSBN could have both deployed and non-deployed launchers on it at a given moment in time, i.e., that there would be a time when all the launchers on a single SSBN might not be fully loaded with SLBMs. Orlov asked whether, in such a scenario, a side would provide a notification, but he deferred further discussion on

this matter for later, noting only that it needed to be decided how long the "temporary" removal of the missiles would last, and that, from a military perspective, all the launchers on the submarine would be considered to be loaded. Trout responded that under the Russian SFO draft treaty, it seemed that a launcher would not be considered deployed if the missile associated with that launcher were removed, even for a short period of time. Orlov requested that this discussion be resumed during the next round.

¶46. (S) Elliott said that this situation was an example of why two separate numbers for delivery vehicle limits were not needed and why there was no need to distinguish between deployed and non-deployed systems: the sides should simply agree to use whatever number that would establish an overall limit on all strategic delivery vehicles, both deployed and non-deployed. Orlov said that this idea would require further discussion, but he was not certain that it would not create problems in counting, adding that the Russian proposal was simpler and more transparent. Further, he stated that there should not be different counting rules depending upon each type of system, there should be one procedure and it should be simple. The procedure should be optimized, and it should be simple for the inspectors to use.

¶47. (S) Warner remarked that the way of handling temporary removal of SLBMs from the tubes when in port was developed by our "wise" predecessors who drafted the START Treaty via the concept of "considered to contain" which he had raised earlier. This concept was designed to provide flexibility

for maintenance operations at the base. He thanked Kuznetsov for his clear explanation of the "exploitation" cycle for strategic submarines, and noted that if the ceiling is high enough to accommodate these numbers, then it would be possible to stay within the non-deployed launcher limit. Warner said that he assumed that the Russian side had completed the requisite analysis to make such an assessment. However, for the U.S. side to better understand the impact of the two limits that the Russian side had proposed, one for deployed strategic delivery vehicles and the other for deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, it was essential to know what categories of systems would fall within those limits. For instance, if such an approach were to be considered by the U.S. side, one element that should not be included within the deployed and non-deployed SLBM component would be the 48 SLBM launchers on the 4 submarines converted to SSGNs, because they can no longer hold or launch ballistic missiles. (Begin comment: Smirnov commented to the side that the Russian side understands this point. End comment.) Warner commented that he had heard that there had been some discussion as to whether these might go into the category of "non-deployed" strategic missile launchers, but this should not be done.

¶48. (S) Antonov noted that, while the end of this round of negotiations was approaching, this did not mean the end of these discussions, which should be continued on October 19 in Geneva. He noted that his delegation still had one more presentation, which could be done on that date. With respect to unfinished business, he noted that the documents related to closing the U.S. monitoring activity at Votkinsk still needed to be signed. He said that he was not sure what else had to be done, but he was a bit concerned and anxious about

it. Also, he noted that work still had to be finished on the Joint Statement concerning Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. He stated that the Russian delegation would be returning to Moscow for only 5 work days at the beginning of November, so there would not be enough time to do it then. Antonov also made another plea concerning the bilateral UNGA resolution, which he acknowledged had been raised directly with U/S Tauscher.

¶49. (S) Gottemoeller agreed that this had been a very productive and fruitful series of presentations and discussions. She said that she still had a question on why the Russian proposal of 600 deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers did not include non-deployed heavy bombers, but that could be discussed later. Orlov agreed to take the question for further discussion in Geneva. On the Joint Statement concerning Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, she provided Antonov with a draft to assist him in his deliberations, and noted that she would go into the rationale for this draft when the two met in Geneva. Antonov remarked that it appeared that much of the Russian-proposed text had been deleted, but Gottemoeller advised him to take a closer look, since some of the Russian text simply had been moved. Antonov agreed to do so.

¶50. (U) Documents exchanged: "Counting Rules Issues from Article III," English and Russian; draft Joint Statement on Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

¶51. (U) Participants:

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller
AMB Ries
Mr. Brown
Mr. Elliott
Ms. Friedt
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Mr. Katsakis
Mr. Sobchenko(Int)

Mr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Koshelev
Ms. Furzhenkova
Mr. Ivanov
Ms. Ivanova
Col Izrazov
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Kuznetsov
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Col Novikov
Gen Orlov
Mr. Pishchulov
Mr. Smirnov

AMB Streltsov
Mr. Trifonov
Mr. Venevtsev
Mr. Vorontsov
Mr. Yermakov
Ms. Zharkikh
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

152. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
Beyrle